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Seider viable notwithstanding Shaffer v. Heitner
In the landmark decision of Seider v. Roth,325 the Court of Appeals held that, where a liability insurance policy is issued by an
326
insurer doing business in New York, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction7
over a nonresident insured may be obtained by attaching the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify.28 Using a Seider attach3 9 injured withment as a basis for jurisdiction, a New York plaintiff
-' 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); see Stein, Jurisdiction by
Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1968); Comment, Garnishment
of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and The Interstate Corporation,67 COLum. L. REV.
550 (1967); Note, Seider v. Roth: The ConstitutionalPhase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as ConstitutionalPhase].
3" Support for the Seider doctrine initially was found in the Supreme Court's decision
in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), wherein it was held that a plaintiff may acquire quasiin-rem jurisdiction over an obligee by garnishing a debt "located" within the state. Since the
situs of the debt follows the obligor, an attachment may be made wherever the obligor may
be found, provided that the obligor "could himself be sued by his creditor in that state." Id.
at 222. See generally Carpenter, JurisdictionOver Debts for the Purpose of Administration,
Garnishment,and Taxation, 31 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1918). Thus, before an insurer's obligation
to defend and indemnify may be attached under Seider, the plaintiff must be able to obtain
in personam jurisdiction over the insurer. The "doing business" standard, a predicate for
obtaining in personam jurisdiction, should be sufficient for this purpose. See Bryant v. Finnish Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); CPLR 301 (1972).
An adjudication quasi-in-rem serves to determine the interests of certain individuals
in specific property. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court characterized quasi-in-rem proceedings as follows:
The judgment is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing
claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of
similar interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what
he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against
him.
Id. at 246 n.12. Since Seider jurisdiction involves the attachment of property that is not the
subject matter of the litigation, it may be viewed as a derivative of the latter category.
3n In Seider, two New York residents were injured in an automobile accident in Vermont.
The allegedly negligent defendant was a Canadian resident whose insurance company was
doing business in New York. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100. The
Seider Court held that, notwithstanding the conditional nature of the obligation, the insurance company's duty under the insurance policy to defend and indemnify the defendant
constituted a debt under CPLR 5201 and was subject to attachment pursuant to CPLR 6202.
Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101; see In re Estate of Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73,
181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962); note 326 supra.
m In Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977), the
Court of Appeals held that only a New York resident may utilize a Seider attachment as a
predicate for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969), discussed in The Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 532, 570
(1970); Farrel v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
840 (1969); Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1968); cf.
ERNETA v. Princeton Hospital, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1978, at 5, col. 1 (1st Dep't) (plaintiff
need'not be New York resident when accident occurs). But cf. McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc.
2d 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970) (attachment by nonresident per-
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out the state may bring suit in New York against the nonresident
insured and recover up to the face amount of the insurance policy. 30
Criticized since its inception,131the Seider doctrine appeared to be
332
in jeopardy when the Supreme Court held, in Shaffer v. Heitner,
that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may not be constitutionally exercised
over a nonresident unless he has certain "minimum contacts" with
mitted to prevent undue hardship). Although this rule originally was based on principles of
forum non conveniens, Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25
(2d Dep't 1968), the Donawitz Court based its holding on jurisdictional grounds, reasoning
that the obligation to defend and indemnify is not of sufficient substance to support the
assertion of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction where the plaintiff is a nonresident. 42 N.Y.2d at 142
& n.*, 366 N.E.2d at 256 & n.*, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595 & n.*. Some critics of the Donawitz
decision, however, have argued that this reasoning is unsound since the plaintiff's residence
would seem irrelevant to the court's exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See, e.g., McLaughlin, Seider v. Roth-DeadorAlive?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1977, at 24, cols. 3,4. Moreover,
it has been suggested that precluding nonresidents from utilizing Seider may be violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 144-45,
366 N.E.2d 253, 257-58, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596-97 (1977) (Jasen, J., concurring).
m See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967),
rehearingdenied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
31 Throughout its 12-year history, commentators and jurists have expressed discomfort
with the Seider doctrine. See, e.g., Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1966) (Burke, J., dissenting); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance
Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108 (1968); Note, JurisdictionIn Rem and the Attachment of
Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, 744-65; ConstitutionalPhase,
supra note 325; Note, Quasi in rem JurisdictionBased on Insurer's Obligations,19 STAN. L.
REV. 654 (1967). The Seider doctrine has had the support of only a bare majority on the Court
of Appeals. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967); Victor v. Lyon Assoc. Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967).
In Neuman v. Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 999, 1000, 355 N.E.2d 294, 294, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240, 240
(1976), the Court upheld Seider jurisdiction "on the ground of stare decisis alone." While the
Court again reaffirmed Seider in 1977, it did so in a manner which reflected considerable
dissatisfaction with the doctrine. See Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977). See also Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); CPLR
5201, commentary at 16 (McKinney Supp. 1977); Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 668 (1975).

Several jurisdictions outside New York have rejected the Seiderprocedure outright. See,
e.g., Robinson v. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970); Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp.
1089 (D. Conn. 1975); Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970); Javorek v. Superior
Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 644 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976); Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So.
2d 701 (La. App'. 1972); State ex rel. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Laskey, 454 S.W.2d 942
(Mo. App. 1970); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972);
Jardine v. Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258
A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Housley v. Anaconda
Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967). But see Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044
(D. Minn. 1973); Savshuk v. Rush, 245 N.E.2d 624 (Minn. 1976), discussed in note 357 infra.
Moreover, in a decision which seemed to be a retaliation against New York's adherence to
Seider, one state court held that the doctrine could be invoked only against a New York defendant. Compare Forbes v. Boyton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973) with Camire v.
Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
= 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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the forum state.3 3 Thus the mere existence of a contractual relationship between the defendant and an insurer doing business in the
state seemed insufficient under Shaffer to justify the assertion of
34
jurisdiction over a nonresident.
m Id. at 207. In Shaffer, a nonresident of Delaware brought a shareholders derivative suit
in a Delaware state court against a Delaware corporation and several of its officers for an
alleged breach of corporate duties. Id. at 190. In an attempt to bring the individual nonresident defendants within its jurisdiction, the Delaware court granted the plaintiff's motion for
sequestration of approximately 82,000 shares of corporate stock owned by the defendants. Id.
at 192. This ruling was consistent with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975), which makes
Delaware the situs of all stock issued by Delaware corporations. The Supreme Court, however,
vacated the sequestration order, finding that the mere presence of personal property within
a state was an insufficient basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident. 433 U.S.
at 209. Applying the "minimum contacts" test enunciated in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court concluded that due process would be offended if Delaware
were permitted directly to exercise jurisdiction over the individual defendants. 433 U.S. at
216-17. Similarly, the Shaffer Court reasoned that it would be unconstitutional to subject
the defendant to Delaware jurisdiction indirectly through the use of the attachment procedure. Id. at 209.
3 In overruling Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), the Shaffer Court stated:
It would not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the
rationales of Pennoyer and Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might have
been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.
433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
The application in Shaffer of the "minimum contacts" criterion is believed to have far
reaching effects on the ability of plaintiffs to acquire jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
See, e.g., Comment, Quasi In Rem on the Heels of Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe
Fits . . . . 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 459 (1977); Comment, The Reasonableness Standard in
State-Court Jurisdiction:Shaffer v. Heitner and The Uniform Minimum Contacts Theory,
14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51 (1978). Some commentators have suggested that Seider cannot
stand in light of Shaffer. See, e.g., Note, Minimum Contacts and JurisdictionalTheory in
New York: The Effect of Shaffer v. Heitner, 42 ALB. L. REv. 294, 311 (1978); Note, Shaffer
v. Heitner: New Constitutional Questions Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HOFSTRA L. RaV.
393, 414-17 (1978). Others, however, believe Seider withstands the test of Shaffer. See,
e.g., Silbermaan, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 90-101
(1978); Williams, The Validity of Assuming Jurisdictionby the Attachment of Automobile
Liability Insurance Obligations: The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner upon Seider v. Roth, 9
RuT.-CAM. L.J. 241 (1978). See also [1978] N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1978]
McKinney's Session Law News A-141, -147, discussed in note 354 infra.
A number of lower courts utilized the Shaffer opinion as a basis for rejecting the Seider
doctrine. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Hayes Bros., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1978, at 4, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County); Schoen v. Berotti, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1978, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County); Vaccaro v. Licker, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 17, 1978, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County);
Attanasio v. Ferre, 93 Misc. 2d 661, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1977);
Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977);
Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County 1977); cf.
Chapra v. Johncox, 60 App. Div. 2d 55, 60-62, 401 N.Y.S.2d 332, 336 (4th Dep't 1977)
(rejecting Seider by implication). For a discussion of the dichotomy in the post-Shaffer
decisions, see Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 409, 422-26 (1978).
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Notwithstanding the apparent effect of Shaffer, many lower
courts in New York continued to recognize the constitutionality of
Seider 3 5 Several courts adopted the position that a Seider attachment is distinguishable from the typical quasi-in-rem action, in
which the property serving as the jurisdictional predicate is completely unrelated to the underlying cause of action. 336 Although after
Shaffer such actions appeared untenable, Seider, it was reasoned,
remained unaffected because the contractual obligation arises out
37
of the same set of facts as those underlying the cause of action.
Concluding that the Shaffer rationale left Seider intact, those courts
also emphasized that Seider jurisdiction cannot result in a diminution of the nonresident's personal assets.338
At least one federal court has concluded that Seider cannot withstand the sweeping
language of the Shaffer decision. See Torres v. Towmotor, Inc., No. 77-1810 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
18, 1977). Rejecting the direct action argument, the Torres court observed that, while Seider
has only the "effect" of a direct action against the insurer, "the defendant remains the focus
of the minimal contacts examination." Slip op. at 24-25. The Torres court concluded that
Seidercannot withstand Shaffer analysis at the initial stage of inquiry where jurisdiction over
the nonresident defendant must be established. Id. at 24-26. Seider's weakness was described
in Torres as follows:
Harris was the seed from which Seider evolved and it provided the roots through
which Seider was nourished. Thus, since the seed has been pulled out and its roots
have been severed from the fertile field of legal precedent by Shaffer, Seider's
viability has been quashed. The continued existence and use of the Seider procedure after the Shaffer decision would be diametrically opposed to the fundamental
guarantee of due process.
Id. at 36.
3 See note 15 infra.
"I See, e.g., Alford v. McGaw, 61 App. Div. 2d 504, 506-07, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (4th
Dep't 1978); Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1978); Nelson v. Warner Bros. Jungle Habitat, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1978, at 7, col. 1
(Sup. Ct. Kings County).
3n See note 336 supra. The argument that the obligation which provides the jurisdictional predicate in Seider is closely related to the cause of action, represents an attempt to
preserve the Seider doctrine in the face of quasi-in-rem cases where the attached property
"is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action." Shaffer v. Heitner, 483 U.S. 186,
209 (1978). This contention has been criticized, however, as a "boot strap" approach to
acquiring jurisdiction. McLaughlin, supra note 329, at 24, col. 1.Dean McLaughlin notes that
the insurer's obligation under the attached policy is inchoate and therefore does not become
"property" until an action has been commenced against the insured. Since no action can be
validly commenced until adequate jurisdiction is obtained over the insured, in Dean
McLaughlin's view, "[tihe major analytical flaw. . . of Seider" is its circularity. Id.
"I See Alford v. McGaw, 61 App. Div. 2d 504, 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (4th Dep't
1978). See also O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Packing Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3386 (Dec. 5, 1978). The contention that an adjudication pursuant to a Seider
attachment does not affect the personal assets of the insured seems to ignore some of the valid
interests which the insured has in the action. Under most liability policies, for example, the
insured is required to cooperate in the defense of the action. Thus, while the insured cannot
be held personally liable in a Seider action, he faces the prospect of losing time and money
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A more satisfactory approach was taken by some authorities
who considered Seider as in effect a judicially created right of direct
action against the tortfeasor's insurer. 9 Under this approach, the
tortfeasor is deemed a nominal defendant in the action, with the
insurer viewed as the real party in interest3 0 Thus, as long as the
insurer has the requisite contacts with New York, Shaffer would not
bar the assertion of jurisdiction. This reasoning has been resisted by
the Court of Appeals,341 however, because direct actions against insurers are expressly precluded by statute in New York.34
as a result of having to appear at trial. In addition, an adverse judgment in a Seider action
could result in an increase in the defendant's insurance rates or the cancellation or nonrenewal of his policy. 7A WK&M 6202.06a. Seider, however, provides a vehicle through
which the injured party can seek at least a limited recovery in New York without having to
expend time and money in traveling to some distant forum in order to seek redress.
31 See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
47 U.S.L.W. 3386 (Dec. 5, 1978); Alford v. McGaw, 61 App. Div. 2d 504, 508, 402 N.Y.S.2d
499, 502 (4th Dep't 1978); cf. Rich v. Rich, 93 Misc. 2d 409, 402 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978) (attachment of inheritance proceeds permitted when redress possible only in
New York). See also Smith v. Kraftco Corp., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 1978, at 12, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County); Nelson v. Warner Bros. Jungle Habitat, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1978, at 7, col. 1
(Sup. Ct. Kings County); Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1978).
"0 The direct action theory as an explanation of Seider first appeared more than 10 years
prior to the Shaffer decision. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669,
672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967). As the Court stated in Thrasher v. United States Liab.
Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167, 255 N.E.2d 503, 507, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (1967): "The law
maintains the fiction that the insured is the real party in interest at the trial of the underlying
negligence action [only] in order to protect the insurance company against overly sympathetic juries."
34 In Seider, the Court of Appeals indicated its reluctance to characterize Seider as a
direct action when it stated:
It is said by affirmance here we would be setting up a "direct action" against
the insurer. That is true to the extent only that affirmance will put jurisdiction in
New York State and require the insurer to defend here, not because a debt owing
by it to the defendant has been attached but because by its policy it has agreed to
defend in any place where jurisdiction is obtained against its insured. Jurisdiction
is properly acquired. . . since the policy obligation is a debt owed to the defendant
by the insurer.
17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102; accord, Donawitz v. Danek, 42
N.Y.2d 138, 143, 366 N.E.2d 253, 261, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1977) (Jasen, J., concurring);
Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d at 151, 366 N.E.2d at 262, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671-72, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633, 637 (1967).
312 N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(7) (McKinney 1966) provides that an action may be maintained
against the insurer only where the injured plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the
insured. This statute was enacted to prevent the excessively high damage awards that might
result if juries were aware that an insurer rather than an individual would be satisfying the
judgment. See Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167, 225 N.E.2d 503,
507, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (1967); Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 461, 171 N.E.2d 454,
460, 209 N.Y.S.2d 304, 312 (1960); Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 123-27,
148 N.Y.S.2d 524, 530-33 (2d Dep't 1955). These public policy considerations, however, do
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The two basic approaches to the question of Seider's constitutionality were considered in Alford v. McGaw,4 3 a recent fourth
department decision. Utilizing both lines of reasoning in support of
its holding, 344 the Alford court concluded that the exercise of jurisnot necessarily eliminate the possibility that Seider is justifiable as a judicially created direct
action. As noted by Chief Judge Fuld:
Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as the present is in full control of
the litigation; it selects the defendant's attorneys; it decides if and when to settle;
and it makes all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation. . . . Moreover, where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state and the insurer is present
in and regulated by it, the State has a substantial and continuing relation with the
controversy. For jurisdictional purposes, in assessing fairness under the due process
clause and in determining the public policy of New York, such factors loom large.
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967)
(citations omitted).
It should be noted, however, that several years ago, the legislature attempted to enact a
direct action statute, but the measure was vetoed as a result of drafting difficulties.
SIXTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE 264 (1971); see Gov. Veto Mess. (1973), reprinted
in [1973] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 349.
As support for the contention that direct action statutes are constitutionally permissible,
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), is the case most often cited.
In Watson, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana direct action statute,
LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978). Other jurisdictions have direct action statutes,
e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2001, 2003(1) (1958 & Supp. 1975-1976); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 27-7-2 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 803.04(2) (West 1977). Such statutes differ significantly from the Seider-form of direct action, however, since the statutes require that the
accident occur within the state itself. See Lee-Hy Paving Corp. v. O'Connor, 27 U.S.L.W.
3386, 3387 (Dec. 5, 1978) (Powell, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.). In
analogizing Seider to a judicially created direct action, New York courts have not addressed
this distinction. But see Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Therefore, even if Seider is viewed as a direct action against
the insurer, its constitutionality may be open to question. For a general discussion of direct
action statutes, see Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operationaland Conflict-of-Law
Problems, 74 HARV. L. REV. 357 (1960).
3 61 App. Div. 2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (4th Dep't 1978). In Alford, a father and his
infant son, both residents of New York, brought a negligence action against the defendant,
an Ontario resident, for injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff in an automobile accident
which occured in Ontario. Id. at 505, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 500. Since the defendant had no actual
contacts with New York, the plaintiffs had to utilize the Seider doctrine to obtain jurisdiction.
Id., 402 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01.
311 There is some support for the proposition that, whether Seider is viewed as a traditional quasi-in-rem action or a judicially-created direct action, the ultimate determination
should be the same. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
Evaluating Seider, the Restatement observes:
The jurisdictional question would seem to be the same for both "direct action" and
attachment jurisdiction. If the circumstances that the plaintiff is a resident of state
X and the insurance company is doing business there are sufficient to sustain in
personam jurisdiction for a "direct action" against the insurer,they should also be
sufficient to sustain attachment jurisdiction against the insurer, and vice versa.
Id. §§ 84-86 (emphasis added). Such an analysis of Seider jurisdiction is misleading, however,
since it places the focus solely on the insurer and disregards the need to demonstrate a
jurisdictional nexus between the tortfeasor and the forum state.
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diction over a nonresident defendant does not offend the constitutional principles enunciated in Shaffer. 45 The court stressed that
the "insurer plays the critical role" and "bears the major risk" of
the litigation."' Moreover, in the Alford court's view, the relationship between the insurer's contractual obligation and the plaintiff's
underlying cause of action was sufficient to establish the requisite
"minimum contacts" among the 'defendant, the State and the
litigation. .

. . "'I

Recognizing that its holding had "overtones" of

a direct action against the insurer, the appellate division nevertheless found that such an "effect" did not preclude a "full consideration of the insurer's role in the litigation . . . where the insurer's
'348
anonymity will be preserved throughout the proceedings.

Since Alford was decided, the Court of Appeals has resolved the
question of Seider's continuing viability after Shaffer. In Baden v.
Staples, 3' the Court of Appeals focused on the policy considerations
'5 61 App. Div. 2d at 507, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 502. The Alford court seemed somewhat
cautious in upholding Seider, neither adopting the direct action analysis nor calling it a quasiin-rem action against the insured. Id. at 506-07, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 502. The circumspect
attitude of the court takes on added significance in light of an earlier fourth department
decision which indicated that Seider was unconstitutional under Shaffer. See Chappa v.
Johncox, 60 App. Div. 2d 55, 60-62, 401 N.Y.S.2d 332, 336 (4th Dep't 1977).
" 61 App. Div. 2d at 508, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
u Id. at 507, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09
(1978)).
31361 App. Div. 2d at 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 503. The Alford majority quoted Chief Judge
Desmond's statement in Seider that .'there is no policy reason against requiring the insurer
to come in to New York and defend as to an [out-of-state] accident which . . . [injures]
New York residents."' Id. (quoting Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (1967)). In addition, the Alford majority noted that "'[i]n the absence

of any corrective measures taken by the Legislature,' [the] direct action" effect of Seider is
consistent with public policy. 61 App. Div. 2d at 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (citing Donawitz

v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 366 N.E.2d 253, 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1977)).
Justice Hancock, in a separate concurring opinion, argued that Seider and its progeny
are "no longer the law in this state." 61 App. Div. 2d at 511, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 504 (Hancock,
J., concurring). According to Justice Hancock, the majority was merely "attributing the New
York contacts of the insurance company to the defendant for the purpose of securing jurisdiction." Id. at 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (Hancock, J., concurring). Since the insured had not
purposefully availed himself of the privileges or protections of New York laws, he reasoned
that the requisite minimum contacts were lacking and an assertion of jurisdiction would be
unfair. Id. at 510, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (Hancock, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Hancock noted that the fair warning aspect of jurisdiction discussed in Sheller was not satisfied
by the Seider doctrine since an individual who purchases an insurance policy in some distant
state is unlikely to be aware that by doing so he is subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of
the New York courts. Id. (Hancock, J., concurring); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 413 U.S. 186, 218
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
3' N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 1, col. 6 (per curiam). In Baden, the plaintiffs, apparently
New York residents, were injured in an automobile accident in New Hampshire. Id. at 1, col.
6, at 5, col. 1. Seeking to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants, who were New Hampshire
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supporting Seider's continued use. 5 Echoing previous decisions
upholding Seider, the Court stated that "[c]onsiderations of stare
decisis and institutional stability" required that Seider again be
sustained, "absent compelling grounds to the contrary."' While
the Baden Court appeared to approve the direct action analysis
stressed by the fourth department,3 5 it summarily disposed of the
constitutional issues and concluded that Seider does not conflict
with the principles enunciated in Shaffer."'
Despite the Court of Appeals' recent reaffirmation of Seider,
the controversy surrounding the doctrine is likely to continue. 54
residents, the plaintiffs moved for a Seider attachment. Id. at 5, col. 1. Special Term granted
the motion and the appellate division and Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
15 See N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 5, cols. 1, 2.
21 Id. at 1, col. 6. Recognizing that Seider continued to be a "subject of controversy",
the Court nevertheless found "that it is more important that the law be settled than that it
be settled 'correctly."' Id. at 5, col. 1. In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Fuchsberg also
stated that stare decisis should be the critical consideration in affirming Seider. N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 30, 1978, at 5, col. 2 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring). It is submitted, however, that the Baden
Court's emphasis on stare decisis was misplaced in light of the substantial constitutional and
practical issues involved in Seider. As noted by Chief Judge Fuld:
[Sitare decisi does not compel [the Court] to follow blindly a court-created ruleparticularly one, as here, relating to a procedural matter-once we are persuaded
that reason and a right sense of justice recommend its change.
Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 363, 278 N.E.2d 619, 623, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404
(1972). See also Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 148-51, 366 N.E.2d 253, 259-61, 397
N.Y.S.2d 592, 599-601 (1977) (Jasen, J., concurring).
5 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 5, col. 1; see notes 344-348 and accompanying text supra.
The Baden Court also cited O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3386 (Dec. 5, 1978), wherein the second circuit sustained a Seider
attachment.
I N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1978, at 5, col. 1. Five days before Baden was decided, another
difficulty for the Seider doctrine appeared. The Appellate Division, Third Department, dismissed a Seider action on the ground of forum non conveniens, although the plaintiff was a
New York resident. Epstein v. Sirivejkul, 409 N.Y.S.2d 438 (3d Dep't 1978). The Epstein
court concluded that "there [was] no nexus between this jurisdiction and the instant suit."
Id. at 439. This application of forum non conveniens would seem to provide a vehicle for
dismissing Seider actions for those courts continuing to oppose the doctrine. One commentator has suggested, however, that "[aipplying the doctrine on a case-by-case basis to
sustain some Seider-based cases while dismissing others with virtually the same New York
contacts could be deemed" an abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals. Conveniens
Dismissal Made of Seider Action by Third Department Despite New York Domicile of
Plaintiff,N.Y.L. DIG. no. 226 (October 1978).
"I The Seider question ultimately may be resolved by the legislature. See Report of the
Law Revision Commission Relating to Revision of Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction and Related
Provisions in Article 3 of the CPLR, [19781 N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP., reprintedin 119781
McKinney's Session Law News A-141. The Commission recently has proposed that the CPLR
be amended by the addition of a new section, 302-a, defining the permissible scope of quasiin-rem jurisdiction. Under the new section, the plaintiff would have the burden of establishing the existence of minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum and demonstrating that due process standards are met. [1978] McKinney's Session Law News at A-147. This
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Shaffer clearly requires that all assertions of jurisdiction comply
with the "minimum contacts" criteria." 5 The various approaches
offered in support of Seider's constitutionality, 356 however, do not
answer the question whether the insured, rather than the insurer,
has sufficient contacts with New York so that Shaffer's mandate is
not violated. 57
John E. Ryan
section would require the court to consider seven factors in determining the existence of
"minimum contacts":
(1) the plaintiff's relationship to the state;
(2) the relationship of plaintiff's cause of action to the state;
(3) the defendant's relationship to the state;
(4) any benefit accruing to the defendant because of the relationship of his property
or debt to the state;
(5) the relationship of the garnishee to the state;
(6) whether the property is tangible or intangible and if tangible, whether it is
permanently or temporarily located in the state;
[and]
(7) whether there is another forum reasonably convenient to plaintiff in which he
can obtain relief.
Id. Even under this new proposal, however, Seider's viability may be open to question. The
Commission itself felt that "tt]he Shaffer decision renders New York's Seider rule an extreme application of attachment jurisdiction and highly questionable." Id. Moreover, the
legislative proposal itself is somewhat confusing. Of the seven factors, only the third, fourth
and perhaps the sixth are relevant to the issue of the defendant's contacts with the state. The
other criteria, which are more closely related to the question of forum non conveniens, do not
appear helpful in determining whether the Shaffer requirements are met. Since under
Shaffer, it is the defendant's contacts with the forum state which determine the constitutionality of any assertion of jurisdiction, 433 U.S. at 212, it is difficult to perceive the usefulness
of the Commission's proposal.
11 See notes 332-333 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 336-342 & accompanying text supra.
17 See Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1978);
Torres v. Towmoter Inc., No. 77 Civ. 1810, slip op. at 29 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1977); notes 334,
337-338 supra. See also Attanasio v. Ferre, 93 Misc. 2d 661, 664, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Sup.
Ct. Schenectedy County 1977). In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 257 (1958), the Supreme
Court indicated that, in every assertion of jurisdiction, "it is essential . . . that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253.
This position was reiterated in Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 216. It is difficult, however, to accept that
a nonresident purposefully avails himself of the laws of New York merely by purchasing a
policy from an insurer doing business within the state. But see, Williams, The Validity of
Assuming JurisdictionBy The Attachment of Automobile Liability Insurance Obligations:
The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner upon Seider v. Roth, 9 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 241, 274-77 (1978).
Following its decision in Shaffer, the Supreme Court remanded a Seider challenge for
reconsideration by the state court. Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), remanding 245
N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976). On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court sustained that state's
statutory version of Seider, concluding that the doctrine is consistent with the dual policies
of "providing a forum to residents and extending its jurisdiction to the maximum limits
consistent with due process." 47 U.S.L.W. 2290, 2291 (Nov. 7, 1978). In Rocca v. Kenney,
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Use of plural pronouns in joint will can create binding obligation
New York courts have long recognized that a joint will 3" ' can
bind the signatories to dispose of their estates in a particular manner and preclude a subsequent revocation.3 59 Before an agreement
381 A.2d 330 (N.H. 1977), however, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found Seiderjurisdiction unconstitutional, since its assertion does not require the defendant to have the requisite "minimum contacts" with the forum state. Moreover, although the second circuit upheld
Seider, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W.
3386 (Dec. 5, 1978), it is interesting to note that a previous second circuit decision intimated
that Seider was no longer viable. Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 10i7,
1022 (2d Cir. 1978). Further, the denial of certiorari in O'Connor prompted a strong dissent
on the part of Justice Powell, in which Justice Blackmun joined. See 47 U.S.L.W. 3386 (Dec.
5, 1978) (Powell, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.). In light of these
inconsistent views, it is hoped that the Supreme Court will soon address the Seider issue.
- A joint will has been defined as "a single testamentary instrument that embodies the
testamentary plan of two or more persons and is separately executed by each of the testators
using the instrument." Rich v. Mottek, 14 App. Div. 2d 89, 95, 217 N.Y.S.2d 409, 414 (1st
Dep't 1961) (Valente, J., dissenting), rev'd, 11 N.Y.2d 90, 181 N.E.2d 445, 226 N.Y.S.2d 428
(1962) (quoting 1 PAGE ON WILLS 551 (rev. ed. W. Bowe & D. Parker 1960)). Normally executed
by husband and wife, joint wills are used infrequently. See Recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission to the 1977 Legislature Relating to Proving Contracts to Make Testamentary Dispositions, [1977] N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 2, reprinted in [1977] N.Y. Laws
2248, 2249 (McKinney) [hereinafter cited as Recommendation on Testamentary Dispositions, reprinted in N.Y. Laws].
Although joint in character, such wills operate as the separate will of each subscriber and
can dispose of property owned by them either jointly, severally, or in common. See, e.g.,
Rubenstein v. Mueller, 19 N.Y.2d 228, 225 N.E.2d 540, 278 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1967); In re Will
of Diez, 50 N.Y. 88 (1872); In re Brown's Will, 26 Misc. 2d 1011, 209 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sur. Ct.
Orleans County 1961). Mutual wills, on the other hand, are separate instruments with provisions that "are reciprocal, identical, or substantially similar." Rich v. Mottek, 14 App. Div.
2d 89, 95, 217 N.Y.S.2d 409, 414 (1st Dep't 1961) (Valente, J., dissenting), rev'd, 11 N.Y.2d
90, 181 N.Y.S.2d 445, 226 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1962) (quoting 1 PAGE ON WILLS 553 (rev. ed. W.
Bowe & D. Parker 1960)). See 9D P. ROHAN, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE EPTL
13-2.1171
(1978). The courts have not carefully distinguished between joint and mutual wills. See, e.g.,
In re Aquilino's Will, 53 Misc. 2d 811, 812, 280 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County
1967). Similarly, the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act does not differentiate between joint and
mutual wills for probate purposes. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROc. ACT § 2504 (McKinney 1967).
3s' E.g., Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N.Y. 315, 87 N.E.2d 275 (1949); Hermann v. Ludwig,
229 N.Y. 544, 129 N.E. 908 (1920) (mem.); Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E.
210 (1915). A contract may require the disposition of property by will. See, e.g., Shakespeare
v. Markham, 72 N.Y. 400 (1878); Stanton v. Miller, 58 N.Y. 192 (1874); Parsell v. Stryker,
41 N.Y. 480 (1869). Likewise, there is no doubt that a testamentary contract may be embodied
in a joint will. See Rich v. Mottek, 11 N.Y.2d 90, 181 N.E.2d 445, 226 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1962);
Restetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 108 N.E. 210 (1915). See generally 1 B. DAVIDS, THE
NEW YORK LAW OF WILLS, §§ 412-423 (1923 & Supp. 1965).
When a party breaches a contract not to revoke a joint will by executing a second one
after the death of his co-testator, the second will is admitted to probate as the last will and
testament of the decedent. E.g., In re Higgins' Will, 264 N.Y. 226, 190 N.E. 417 (1934); cf. In
re Miceli's Will, 1 Misc. 2d 375, 145 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1955) (mutual
wills). Third party beneficiaries claiming under the joint will, however, may seek specific
performance of the testamentary contract in the supreme court or surrogate's court. E.g.,

